INHALT

Commission Decision (EU) 2024/3021 of 9 September 2024 on the measures SA.43260 (2018/C) implemented by Germany in favour of Flughafen Frankfurt-Hahn GmbH and Ryanair DAC (notified under document C(2024) 6468)

COMMISSION DECISION (EU) 2024/3021
of 9 September 2024
on the measures SA.43260 (2018/C) implemented by Germany in favour of Flughafen Frankfurt-Hahn GmbH and Ryanair DAC
(notified under document C(2024) 6468)
(Only the German text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
1.
PROCEDURE
2.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES
2.1.
Recipients of the measures
2.1.1.
FFHG
2.1.2.
Ryanair
2.2.
The disputed measures
2.2.1.
Measures relating to FFHG
2.2.1.1.
The guarantee granted by the Land Rhineland-Palatinate to FFHG
2.2.1.2.
The ‘double’ sale by FFHG of a plot of land
2.2.2.
Measures relating to Ryanair
2.2.2.1.
Marketing support to Ryanair
2.2.2.2.
2013, 2015 and 2016 airport services agreements between FFHG and Ryanair
2.2.2.3.
Training support to Ryanair
2.2.2.4.
Financing of a crew and pilot school and a maintenance hall to the benefit of Ryanair
2.3.
Grounds for initiating the procedure
2.3.1.
The guarantee granted by the Land Rhineland-Palatinate to FFHG with respect to a sale of land to the aircraft maintenance company Haitec
2.3.2.
The ‘double’ sale by FFHG of a plot of land
2.3.3.
The training aid to Ryanair
2.3.4.
The financing of a crew and pilot school and a maintenance hall
2.3.5.
The 2005 and 2017 marketing agreements between the Land Rhineland-Palatinate and Ryanair
2.3.6.
The 2013, 2015 and 2016 airport service agreements between FFHG and Ryanair
3.
COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
3.1.
Comments from the complainant
3.1.1.
Regarding measures relating to FFHG
3.1.1.1.
The guarantee granted by the Land Rhineland-Palatinate to FFHG
3.1.1.2.
The ‘double’ sale by FFHG of a plot of land
3.1.2.
Regarding measures relating to Ryanair
3.1.2.1.
The 2005 and 2017 marketing agreements between the Land Rhineland-Palatinate and Ryanair
3.1.2.2.
The 2013, 2015 and 2016 airport service agreements between FFHG and Ryanair
3.1.2.3.
The training support to Ryanair
3.1.2.4.
The financing of a crew and pilot school and a maintenance hall.
3.2.
Comments from Ryanair
3.2.1.
Regarding training aid to Ryanair
3.2.2.
The financing of a crew and pilot school and a maintenance hall.
3.2.3.
The 2005 and 2017 marketing agreements concluded between Land Rhineland-Palatinate and Ryanair
3.2.4.
The 2013, 2015 and 2016 airport service agreements concluded between FFHG and Ryanair
3.3.
Comments from FFHG
3.3.1.
The 2013, 2015 and 2016 airport service agreements between FFHG and Ryanair
3.3.2.
The financing of a crew and pilot school and a maintenance hall.
4.
COMMENTS FROM GERMANY
4.1.
Regarding measures to FFHG
4.1.1.
The guarantee granted by the Land Rhineland-Palatinate to FFHG
4.1.2.
The ‘double’ sale by FFHG of a plot of land
4.2.
Regarding measures of potential aid to Ryanair
4.2.1.
The 2005 and 2017 marketing agreements between the Land Rhineland-Palatinate and Ryanair
4.2.2.
The training support to Ryanair
4.2.3.
The financing of a crew and pilot school and a maintenance hall.
4.2.4.
The 2013, 2015 and 2016 airport service agreements between FFHG and Ryanair
5.
ASSESSMENT OF THE MEASURES
5.1.
Existence of aid
5.1.1.
Regarding measures of potential aid
to FFHG
5.1.1.1.
Guarantee granted by the Land Rhineland-Palatinate to FFHG
5.1.1.1.1. Notion of undertaking and economic activity
5.1.1.1.2. Use of State resources and imputability to the State
5.1.1.1.3. Economic advantage
5.1.1.1.3.1. The applicability of the MEOP
5.1.1.1.3.1.1. Entering into a guarantee agreement is an economic activity
5.1.1.1.3.1.2. A private operator could have engaged in the guarantee agreement in question
5.1.1.1.3.2. The market-conformity of the guarantee premium
5.1.1.1.4. Selectivity
5.1.1.1.5. Distortion of competition and effect on trade
5.1.1.1.6. Conclusion
5.1.1.2.
The ‘double’ sale by FFHG of a plot of land
5.1.2.
Regarding measures of potential aid to Ryanair
5.1.2.1.
The training support to Ryanair
5.1.2.1.1. Notion of undertaking and economic activity
5.1.2.1.2. Use of State resources and imputability to the State
5.1.2.1.3. Economic advantage
5.1.2.1.4. Selectivity
5.1.2.1.5. Distortion of competition and effect on trade
5.1.2.1.6. Conclusion
5.1.2.2.
The financing of a crew and pilot school and a maintenance hall
5.1.2.2.1. Notion of undertaking and economic activity
5.1.2.2.2. Economic advantage
5.1.2.2.3. Conclusion
5.1.2.3.
The 2005 and 2017 marketing agreements between the Land Rhineland-Palatinate and Ryanair
5.1.2.3.1. Notion of undertaking and economic activity
5.1.2.3.2. Use of State resources and imputability to the State
5.1.2.3.3. Economic advantage
5.1.2.3.3.1. Individual assessment of the marketing agreements
5.1.2.3.3.2. Applicability of the market operator principle
5.1.2.3.3.3. For the sake of completeness: Determination of the advantage conferred to Ryanair
5.1.2.3.3.3.1. The purchase of marketing services served only as justification for the payments made to Ryanair to keep the latter at Frankfurt-Hahn airport
—
There was no real intention on the part of the Land Rhineland-Palatinate to advertise the region
—
Ryanair’s flight operations were targeted, rather than marketing services
—
The targeting of Ryanair, rather than any online marketing service provider in general
5.1.2.3.3.3.2. Ryanair’s practice observed in other cases
5.1.2.3.3.3.3. For the sake of completeness: conclusion on the advantage conferred to Ryanair
5.1.2.3.4. Selectivity
5.1.2.3.5. Distortion of competition and effect on trade
5.1.2.3.6. Conclusion
5.1.2.4.
The 2013, 2015 and 2016 airport service agreements between FFHG and Ryanair
5.1.2.4.1. The 2013 Side Letter agreement
5.1.2.4.2. The 2015 Annotation
5.1.2.4.3. The 2016 Side Letter No 2
5.2.
Compatibility of the aid
5.2.1.
Regarding the aid measure to FFHG
5.2.2.
Regarding the aid measures to Ryanair
5.2.2.1.
The training aid to Ryanair
5.2.2.1.1. General Block Exemption Regulation
5.2.2.1.2. Article 107(2) TFEU
5.2.2.1.3. Article 107(3) TFEU
5.2.2.2.
The 2005 and 2017 marketing agreements between the Land Rhineland-Palatinate and Ryanair
6.
RECOVERY
7.
CONCLUSION
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6