INHALT

Commission Decision (EU) 2024/2418 of 11 December 2023 on the measure State aid SA.53625 (2021/C) implemented by Germany for Lignite phase-out (notified under document C(2023) 8551)

COMMISSION DECISION (EU) 2024/2418
of 11 December 2023
on the measure State aid SA.53625 (2021/C) implemented by Germany for Lignite phase-out
(notified under document C(2023) 8551)
(Only the English text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
1.
PROCEDURE
2.
SCOPE OF THE DECISION
3.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE NOTIFIED MEASURE
3.1.
Germany’s climate objectives and the objective of the notified measure
3.2.
Elaboration of policy measures
3.3.
Legal basis
3.3.1.
Initial legal basis
3.3.2.
Amendment to the initial legal basis
3.4.
Grounds for initiating the formal investigation procedure
3.4.1.
Forgone profits reach far into the future
3.4.2.
Deferred closure mechanism
3.4.3.
Alternative scenarios submitted by Germany
3.4.4.
Additional mine rehabilitation costs
3.5.
Amended RWE measure/developments after the Opening Decision
3.5.1.
Postponement of final decommissioning of two units from end-2022 to March 2024
3.5.2.
Acceleration of final decommissioning of three units from 2038 to 2030
3.5.3.
No additional compensation to RWE
3.6.
Revised calculation
3.7.
Budget
3.8.
Granting moment and duration
3.9.
Beneficiary
3.10.
Cumulation and transparency
4.
COMMENTS FROM THIRD PARTIES
4.1.
Existence of aid
4.1.1.
RWE
4.1.2.
LEAG
4.1.3.
Undertakings
4.1.4.
Associations/NGOs
4.1.5.
German states
4.2.
Legal basis for compatibility
4.2.1.
RWE
4.2.2.
LEAG
4.2.3.
Undertakings
4.2.4.
Associations/NGOs
4.3.
Compatibility of aid
4.3.1.
Development of an economic activity
4.3.1.1.
RWE
4.3.1.2.
LEAG
4.3.1.3.
Undertakings
4.3.1.4.
Associations/NGOs
4.3.2.
Incentive effect
4.3.2.1.
RWE
4.3.2.2.
LEAG
4.3.2.3.
Undertakings
4.3.2.4.
Associations / NGOs
4.3.3.
Breach of Union law
4.3.3.1.
RWE
4.3.3.2.
Undertakings
4.3.3.3.
Associations/NGOs
4.3.4.
Necessity
4.3.4.1.
RWE
4.3.4.2.
LEAG
4.3.4.3.
Undertakings
4.3.4.4.
Associations/NGOs
4.3.5.
Appropriateness
4.3.5.1.
RWE
4.3.5.2.
LEAG
4.3.5.3.
Undertakings
4.3.5.4.
Associations/NGOs
4.3.6.
Proportionality
4.3.6.1.
RWE
4.3.6.2.
LEAG
4.3.6.3.
Undertakings
4.3.6.4.
Associations/NGOs
4.3.6.5.
German states
4.3.7.
Avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade
4.3.7.1.
RWE
4.3.7.2.
LEAG
4.3.7.3.
Undertakings
4.3.7.4.
Associations/NGOs
5.
COMMENTS FROM GERMANY
5.1.
Existence of aid
5.2.
Compatibility basis
5.3.
Compatibility of aid
5.3.1.
Incentive effect
5.3.2.
Breach of Union law
5.3.3.
Appropriateness
5.3.4.
Proportionality
5.3.5.
Avoidance of undue effects on competition and trade
5.3.6.
Deferred closure mechanism
5.3.7.
New potential reserves
6.
ASSESSMENT OF THE NOTIFIED MEASURE
6.1.
Existence of aid
6.1.1.
Imputability and involvement of State resources
6.1.2.
Existence of advantage
6.1.2.1.
Compensation under applicable national law
6.1.2.1.1.
Scope of property protection under Article 14 GG
6.1.2.1.1.1.
The measure falls under public law
6.1.2.1.1.2.
Scope of application of Art. 14 GG
6.1.2.1.1.3.
Commission’s considerations
6.1.2.1.2.
The findings of relevant German studies
6.1.2.1.2.1.
Description of the findings
6.1.2.1.3.
Commission’s considerations and conclusion on compensation under applicable national law
6.1.2.2.
The German nuclear phase-out cannot be used as an analogy
6.1.3.
Selectivity
6.1.4.
Impact on competition and on trade between Member States
6.1.5.
Conclusion regarding existence of State aid
6.2.
Lawfulness of the aid
6.3.
Compatibility of the aid
6.3.1.
Legal basis for the assessment
6.3.2.
Positive condition: the aid must facilitate the development of an economic activity
6.3.2.1.
Identification of the economic activity which is being facilitated by the measure, its positive effects for society at large and, where applicable, its relevance for specific policies of the Union.
6.3.2.2.
Incentive effect
6.3.2.3.
No breach of any relevant provision of Union law
6.3.3.
Negative condition: the aid measure must not unduly affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the common interest
6.3.3.1.
Minimisation of distortions of competition and trade
6.3.3.1.1.
Necessity of the aid
6.3.3.1.2.
Appropriateness
6.3.3.1.3.
Proportionality
6.3.3.1.3.1.
Forgone profits reach far into the future
6.3.3.1.3.2.
Deferred closure mechanism and reserve mechanism
6.3.3.1.3.3.
Alternative scenarios submitted by Germany
6.3.3.1.3.4.
Additional mine rehabilitation costs
6.3.3.1.3.5.
Conclusion on proportionality
6.3.3.1.4.
Cumulation
6.3.3.1.5.
Transparency
6.3.3.2.
Avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade
6.3.4.
Weighing the positive effects of the aid against the negative effects on competition and trade
6.3.5.
Companies in difficulty and under recovery order
6.3.6.
Conclusion on the compatibility of the aid
7.
CONCLUSION
Article 1
Article 2