INHALT

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/633 of 14 April 2021 imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of monosodium glutamate originating in the People’s Republic of China and in Indonesia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council

COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2021/633
of 14 April 2021
imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of monosodium glutamate originating in the People’s Republic of China and in Indonesia following an expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 of the European Parliament and of the Council
1. PROCEDURE
1.1. Previous investigations and measures in force
1.2. Request for an expiry review
1.3. Initiation of an expiry review
1.4. Parallel anti-circumvention investigation
1.5. Review investigation period and period considered
1.6. Interested parties
1.6.1. Sampling
1.6.1.1. Sampling of producers in the People’s Republic of China and Indonesia
1.6.1.2. Sampling of importers
1.6.2. Replies to the questionnaire
1.6.3. Verification
2. PRODUCT UNDER REVIEW AND LIKE PRODUCT
2.1. Product under review
2.2. Like product
3. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OR RECURRENCE OF DUMPING
3.1. Preliminary remarks
3.1.1. PRC
3.1.2. Indonesia
3.2. Continuation of dumping during the review investigation period
3.2.1. PRC
3.2.2. Procedure for the determination of the normal value under Article 2(6a) of the basic Regulation for the imports of product under review originating in the PRC.
3.2.2.1. Normal value
3.2.3. Existence of significant distortions
3.2.3.1. Introduction
3.2.3.2. Significant distortions affecting the domestic prices and costs in the PRC
3.2.3.3. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), first indent of the basic Regulation: the market in question being served to a significant extent by enterprises which operate under the ownership, control or policy supervision or guidance of the authorities of the exporting country
3.2.3.4. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), second indent of the basic Regulation: State presence in firms allowing the state to interfere with respect to prices or costs
3.2.3.5. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), third indent of the basic Regulation: public policies or measures discriminating in favour of domestic suppliers or otherwise influencing free market forces
3.2.3.6. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fourth indent of the basic Regulation: the lack, discriminatory application or inadequate enforcement of bankruptcy, corporate or property laws
3.2.3.7. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), fifth indent of the basic Regulation: wage costs being distorted
3.2.3.8. Significant distortions according to Article 2(6a)(b), sixth indent of the basic Regulation: access to finance granted by institutions which implement public policy objectives or otherwise not acting independently of the State
3.2.3.9. Systemic nature of the distortions described
3.2.3.10. Conclusion
3.2.4. Representative country
3.2.4.1. General remarks
3.2.4.2. Production of the product under investigation in the representative country and level of economic development similar to the PRC
3.2.4.3. Readily available data in the representative country
3.2.4.4. Conclusion on representative country
3.2.5. Sources used to establish undistorted costs and benchmarks
3.2.6. Factors of production
3.2.6.1. Raw materials
3.2.6.2. Labour
3.2.6.3. Electricity
3.2.6.4. Consumables/negligible quantities
3.2.6.5. Manufacturing overhead costs, SG&A, profits and depreciation
3.2.7. Calculation
3.2.8. Export price
3.2.9. Comparison and dumping margin
3.2.10. Conclusion
3.3. Indonesia
3.3.1. Normal value
3.3.2. Export price
3.3.3. Comparison and dumping margin
3.3.4. Conclusion
4. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION OF DUMPING
4.1. PRC
4.1.1. Production capacity and spare capacity in the PRC
4.1.2. Attractiveness of the Union market, export prices to third country markets and circumvention
4.1.3. Conclusion on the likelihood of continuation of dumping
4.2. Indonesia
4.2.1. Production capacity and spare capacity in Indonesia
4.2.2. Market situation in Indonesia
4.2.3. Attractiveness of the Union market and export prices to third country markets
4.2.4. Conclusion on the likelihood of continuation of dumping
5. INJURY
5.1. Definition of the Union industry and Union production
5.2. Union consumption
5.3. Imports from the countries concerned
5.3.1. Volume and market share of the imports from the countries concerned
5.3.2. Inward processing system
5.3.3. Prices of the imports from the countries concerned and price undercutting
5.4. Imports from third countries other than the PRC and Indonesia
5.5. Economic situation of the Union industry
5.5.1. General remarks
5.5.2. Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation
5.5.3. Sales volume and market share
5.5.3.1. Growth
5.5.4. Employment and productivity
5.5.5. Magnitude of the dumping margin and recovery from past dumping
5.5.6. Prices and factors affecting prices
5.5.7. Labour costs
5.5.8. Inventories
5.5.9. Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital
5.6. Conclusion on injury
6. LIKELIHOOD OF CONTINUATION AND/OR RECURRENCE OF INJURY
6.1. Likelihood of continuation of injury from the PRC
6.1.1. The production capacity, spare capacity in the PRC and attractiveness of the Union market
6.1.2. Impact of imports from the PRC on the situation of the Union industry should the measures be allowed to lapse
6.1.3. Conclusion
6.2. Likelihood of recurrence of injury from Indonesia
6.2.1. Production capacity and spare capacity in Indonesia, market situation in Indonesia and attractiveness of the Union market
6.2.2. Impact of imports from Indonesia on the situation of the Union industry should the measures be allowed to lapse
6.2.3. Conclusion
7. UNION INTEREST
7.1. Interest of the Union industry
7.2. Interest of unrelated importers
7.3. Interest of users
7.4. Conclusion on Union interest
8. ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5