Commission Decision (EU) 2018/628 of 11 November 2016 on State aid SA.24221(2011/... (32018D0628)
Commission Decision (EU) 2018/628 of 11 November 2016 on State aid SA.24221(2011/C) (ex 2011/NN) implemented by Austria for the Klagenfurt airport, Ryanair and other airlines using the airport (notified under document C(2016) 7131) (Text with EEA relevance. )
- COMMISSION DECISION (EU) 2018/628
- of 11 November 2016
- on State aid SA.24221(2011/C) (ex 2011/NN) implemented by Austria for the Klagenfurt airport, Ryanair and other airlines using the airport
- (notified under document C(2016) 7131)
- (Only the German version is authentic)
- (Text with EEA relevance)
- 1.
- PROCEDURE
- 2.
- DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURES AND GROUNDS FOR INITIATING THE PROCEDURE
- 2.1.
- Introduction
- 2.2.
- General presentation of Klagenfurt Airport
- 2.3.
- Entities involved in the measures at Klagenfurt Airport
- 2.3.1.
- Destinations Management GmbH
- 2.3.2.
- Kärnten Werbung, Marketing & Innovationsmanagement GmbH
- 2.3.3.
- Kärntner Landes- und Hypothekenbank-Holding
- 2.3.4.
- Leading Verge.Com Limited
- 2.3.5.
- Airport Marketing Services (Jersey) Limited
- 2.4.
- Financing of Klagenfurt Airport by the City of Klagenfurt, the State of Carinthia and other entities
- 2.5.
- The Airport Incentive Scheme of Kärntner Flughafen Betriebs GmbH of 2005
- 2.6.
- The agreements with Ryanair, LV and AMS
- 2.6.1.
- The 2002 agreements
- 2.6.1.1.
- The airport services agreement between KFBG and Ryanair of 22 January 2002
- 2.6.1.2.
- The marketing agreement between DMG and LV of 22 January 2002 (the first marketing agreement)
- 2.6.1.3.
- The marketing agreement between DMG and AMS of 22 January 2002 (the second marketing agreement)
- 2.6.1.4.
- The side letter of the marketing agreement between DMG and LV of 22 January 2002 (the third marketing agreement)
- 2.6.1.5.
- Summary of the payments under the different agreements with Ryanair and its subsidiaries
- 2.6.2.
- The 2006 agreements
- 2.6.2.1.
- The airport services agreement between KFBG and Ryanair of 23 August 2006
- 2.6.2.2.
- The marketing agreement between DMG and AMS of 21 December 2006
- 2.7.
- The agreements with Hapag Lloyd Express (HLX) and Tuifly
- 2.8.
- The agreement with Air Berlin
- 2.9.
- The agreement with Austrian Airlines of 20 October 2005
- 2.10.
- Grounds for initiating the procedure in February 2012 and extending the procedure in July 2014
- 2.10.1.
- Financing of Klagenfurt Airport by the City of Klagenfurt, the State of Carinthia and other entities
- 2.10.2.
- The Airport Incentive Scheme of Kärntner Flughafen Betriebs GmbH of 2005
- 2.10.3.
- The agreements with Ryanair, LV and AMS in 2002 and 2006
- 2.10.4.
- The agreements with Hapag Lloyd Express (HLX) and Tuifly
- 2.10.5.
- The agreement with Air Berlin
- 2.10.6.
- The agreement with Austrian Airlines of 20 October 2005
- 3.
- COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES SUBMITTED BY THE AUSTRIAN AUTHORITIES
- 4.
- COMMENTS FROM AUSTRIA
- 5.
- COMMENTS FROM INTERESTED PARTIES
- 5.1.
- Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa, Germanwings
- 5.2.
- Ryanair
- 5.2.1.
- Comments made directly by Ryanair
- 5.2.2.
- Reports and analyses provided by Ryanair
- 5.2.2.1.
- Oxera Note 1 — Economic MEIP
- (11)
- Assessment for Klagenfurt Airport, prepared for Ryanair by Oxera, 4 July 2011
- 5.2.2.2.
- Oxera Note 2 — Economic MEIP Assessment for Klagenfurt Airport, prepared for Ryanair by Oxera, 31 August 2012
- 5.2.2.3.
- Oxera Note 3 — Identifying the market benchmark in comparator analysis for MEO tests. Ryanair State aid cases, prepared for Ryanair by Oxera, 9 April 2013
- 5.2.2.4.
- Oxera Note 4 — Principles underlying profitability analysis for MEO tests. Ryanair State aid cases, prepared for Ryanair by Oxera, 9 April 2013
- 5.2.2.5.
- Analysis of Professor Damien P. McLoughlin — Brand building: why and how small brands should invest in marketing, prepared for Ryanair, 10 April 2013
- 5.2.2.6.
- Oxera Note 5 — Are prices set by AMS in line with the market rate?, prepared for Ryanair by Oxera, 20 December 2013
- 5.2.2.7.
- Oxera Notes 6 and 7 — How should AMS Agreements be treated within the profitability analysis as part of the market operator test?, prepared for Ryanair by Oxera, 17 and 31 January 2014
- 5.2.2.8.
- Oxera Note 8 — Allocation of investment costs, prepared for Ryanair, 12 September 2014
- 5.2.2.9.
- Oxera Note 9 — Evaluating the wider impact of AMS Agreements on airport traffic, prepared for Ryanair by Oxera, 26 September 2014
- 5.2.2.10.
- Oxera Note 10 — Economic MEOP assessment: Klagenfurt Airport — profitability analysis, prepared for Ryanair by Oxera, 3 November 2014
- 5.2.2.11.
- Oxera Note 11 — Why is comparator analysis an important supplement to profitability analysis in MEOP assessments?, prepared for Ryanair by Oxera, 26 January 2015
- 5.2.2.12.
- Oxera Note 12 — Economic MEOP assessments: comparator analysis, including AMS, Addendum to Oxera's 2010 report, 10 April 2015
- 5.2.2.13.
- Oxera Note 13 — The impact of Ryanair's operations on airports' non-aeronautical revenues, 4 December 2015
- 5.3.
- AMS
- 5.3.1.
- On AMS and the Ryanair website
- 5.3.2.
- On the absence of advantages to AMS or Ryanair
- 5.3.3.
- On the pricing of AMS' services
- 6.
- COMMENTS FROM AUSTRIA ON INTERESTED PARTY COMMENTS
- 6.1.
- Austria's comments on interested party submissions by Austrian Airlines, Lufthansa, Germanwings
- 6.2.
- Austria's comments on interested party submissions by Ryanair and AMS
- 7.
- ASSESSMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF AID
- 7.1.
- The financing of KFBG and DMG
- 7.1.1.
- Economic activity and notion of undertaking
- 7.1.1.1.
- Single economic unit
- 7.1.1.2.
- Economic activity
- 7.1.1.3.
- Public policy remit
- 7.1.2.
- State resources and imputability to the State
- 7.1.3.
- Economic advantage
- 7.1.3.1.
- Market Economy Operator Principle
- 7.1.3.2.
- Service of general economic interest
- 7.1.4.
- Selectivity
- 7.1.5.
- Distortion of competition and effect on trade
- 7.1.6.
- Conclusion
- 7.2.
- The 2005 incentive scheme
- 7.2.1.
- Economic activity and notion of undertaking
- 7.2.2.
- Economic advantage
- 7.2.3.
- Conclusion
- 7.3.
- The conclusion of the settlement agreement with AUA and the application of the 2005 incentive scheme to AUA
- 7.3.1.
- Economic activity and notion of undertaking
- 7.3.2.
- Economic advantage
- 7.3.2.1.
- Time frame for the Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
- 7.3.2.2.
- Assessment
- 7.3.3.
- Conclusion
- 7.4.
- The 2002 agreements with Ryanair, LV and AMS
- 7.4.1.
- Economic activity and notion of undertaking
- 7.4.2.
- State resources and imputability to the State
- 7.4.3.
- Economic advantage
- 7.4.3.1.
- Application of the Market Economy Operator Principle to the 2002 agreements with Ryanair, LV and AMS
- (a)
- Regarding an analysis of the marketing services agreements and the airport services agreement together
- (b)
- Regarding the benefits that an MEO could have expected to gain from marketing services agreements and the price that it would have been willing to pay for those services
- (c)
- The feasibility of comparing Klagenfurt airport to other European airports
- 7.4.3.2.
- Conclusion on the terms for applying the market economy operator test
- 7.4.3.3.
- Time frame for the Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
- 7.4.3.4.
- Assessment
- 7.4.3.5.
- Conclusion on economic advantage
- 7.4.4.
- Selectivity
- 7.4.5.
- Distortion of competition and effect on trade
- 7.4.6.
- Conclusion
- 7.5.
- The 2006 agreements with Ryanair and AMS
- 7.5.1.
- Economic activity and notion of undertaking
- 7.5.2.
- State resources and imputability to the State
- 7.5.3.
- Economic advantage
- 7.5.3.1.
- Market Economy Operator Principle
- 7.5.3.2.
- Market Economy Operator Principle — Regarding an analysis of the marketing services agreements and the airport services agreement together
- 7.5.3.3.
- Time frame for the Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
- 7.5.3.4.
- Assessment
- 7.5.3.5.
- Conclusion on economic advantage
- 7.5.4.
- Selectivity
- 7.5.5.
- Distortion of competition and effect on trade
- 7.5.6.
- Conclusion
- 7.6.
- The 2003 agreement with HLX
- 7.6.1.
- Economic activity and notion of undertaking
- 7.6.2.
- State resources and imputability to the State
- 7.6.3.
- Economic advantage
- 7.6.3.1.
- Market Economy Operator Principle
- 7.6.3.2.
- Time frame for the Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
- 7.6.3.3.
- Assessment
- 7.6.3.4.
- Conclusion on economic advantage
- 7.6.4.
- Selectivity
- 7.6.5.
- Distortion of competition and effect on trade
- 7.6.6.
- Conclusion
- 7.7.
- The 2008 agreement with Tuifly
- 7.7.1.
- Economic activity and notion of undertaking
- 7.7.2.
- State resources and imputability to the State
- 7.7.3.
- Economic advantage
- 7.7.3.1.
- Market Economy Operator Principle
- 7.7.3.2.
- Time frame for the Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
- 7.7.3.3.
- Assessment
- 7.7.3.4.
- Conclusion on economic advantage
- 7.7.4.
- Selectivity
- 7.7.5.
- Distortion of competition and effect on trade
- 7.7.6.
- Conclusion
- 7.8.
- The 2009 agreement with Air Berlin
- 7.8.1.
- Economic advantage
- 7.8.1.1.
- Market Economy Operator Principle
- 7.8.1.2.
- Time frame for the Assessment of incremental costs and revenues
- 7.8.1.3.
- Assessment
- 7.8.1.4.
- Conclusion on economic advantage
- 7.8.2.
- Conclusion
- 7.9.
- Conclusion on existence of aid
- 8.
- LAWFULNESS OF THE AID
- 8.1.
- The financing of KFBG
- 8.2.
- The 2002 and 2006 agreements with Ryanair, LV and AMS
- 8.3.
- The 2003 agreement with HLX and the 2008 agreement with Tuifly
- 9.
- ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE AID
- 9.1.
- The financing of KFBG
- 9.1.1.
- Compatibility pursuant to the 2014 Aviation Guidelines
- 9.1.1.1.
- Contribution to a well-defined objective of common interest
- 9.1.1.2.
- Need for State intervention
- 9.1.1.3.
- Appropriateness of State aid as a policy instrument
- 9.1.1.4.
- Existence of incentive effect
- 9.1.1.5.
- Proportionality of the aid amount (aid limited to the minimum necessary)
- 9.1.1.6.
- Avoidance of undue negative effects on competition and trade
- 9.1.2.
- Conclusion
- 9.2.
- Agreements with airlines — Applicable legal framework
- 9.2.1.
- The 2002 agreements with Ryanair
- 9.2.2.
- The 2006 agreements with Ryanair
- 9.2.3.
- The 2003 agreement with HLX
- 9.2.4.
- The 2008 agreement with Tuifly
- 9.3.
- The 2002 agreements with Ryanair, LV and AMS
- 9.3.1.
- Compatibility assessment pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU: the aid must be limited in time and involve a route likely to become profitable
- 9.3.2.
- The aid must be proportional, i.e. the amount must be linked to the net development of traffic.
- 9.3.3.
- Conclusion
- 9.4.
- The 2006 agreements with Ryanair and AMS — Compatibility assessment pursuant to 2005 Aviation Guidelines
- 9.5.
- The 2003 agreement with HLX
- 9.5.1.
- Compatibility assessment pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU
- 9.5.2.
- The aid must be limited in time and involve a route likely to become profitable
- 9.5.3.
- Conclusion
- 9.6.
- The 2008 agreement with Tuifly — Compatibility assessment pursuant to 2005 Aviation Guidelines
- 10.
- CONCLUSION
- 11.
- RECOVERY
- 11.1.
- Determination of the aid amounts
- 11.2.
- Effective termination dates of certain agreements
- 11.3.
- Marketing payments taken into account
- Article 1
- Article 2
- Article 3
- Article 4
- Article 5
- Article 6
- Article 7
- Article 8
- Article 9
- Article 10
- Article 11
- Article 12
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