INHALT

Commission Decision (EU) 2024/2057 of 28 February 2023 on the State aid SA.48556 (2019/C) (ex 2018/N) – Hungary – LIP – Regional investment aid to Samsung SDI (notified under document C(2023) 1478)

COMMISSION DECISION (EU) 2024/2057
of 28 February 2023
on the State aid SA.48556 (2019/C) (ex 2018/N) – Hungary – LIP – Regional investment aid to Samsung SDI
(notified under document C(2023) 1478)
(Only the EN version is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
1.
PROCEDURE
2.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE AID MEASURE
2.1.
Objective of the aid measure
2.2.
The beneficiary
2.3.
The investment project and eligible costs
2.3.1.
The investment project
2.3.2.
Eligible investment costs
24.
Form of aid, aid granting authority and national legal basis
2.5.
Aid amount
2.6.
Aid intensity and cumulation with other investment aid
2.7.
Own contribution
2.8.
Maintenance of the assisted activity
2.9.
Grounds for initiating the formal investigation procedure
3.
COMMENTS FROM HUNGARY AND SAMSUNG SDI
3.1.
Contribution to regional development and territorial cohesion
3.2.
Incentive effect
3.2.1.
Counterfactual
3.2.2.
Recalculated local sourcing levels in both Xi’an (China) and Göd (Hungary) counterfactuals
3.2.2.1.
Xi’an (China)
3.2.2.2.
Göd (Hungary)
3.2.2.3.
The [18-22] % mark-up on non-locally sourced equipment
3.2.3.
Public support for the proposed alternative location in Xi’an, China
3.2.4.
Introduction by Samsung SDI of a ‘discrete’ and a ‘probabilistic’ approach for a viability gap calculation
3.3.
Proportionality
3.4.
Necessity and appropriateness
3.5.
Undue negative effects on competition and trade
4.
COMMENTS FROM THE MINISTRY OF TRADE, INDUSTRY AND ENERGY OF SOUTH KOREA ON THE EXTENSION DECISION
5.
ASSESSMENT
5.1.
Existence of aid
5.2.
Lawfulness of the aid measure
5.3.
Compatibility of the aid measure
5.3.1.
Objective of promoting regional development
5.3.1.1.
Real and sustained contribution to regional development
5.3.1.2.
Incentive effect
5.3.1.2.1. The existence of overriding strategic considerations nullifying from the outset the credibility of the Chinese alternative location
5.3.1.2.2. Differences in costs of machinery and local sourcing levels in Xi’an and Göd
5.3.1.2.2.1 Lack of credibility of the initial assumption of full local sourcing for equipment and machinery in both locations
5.3.1.2.2.2. Commission’s assessment of a realistic level of costs of machinery and equipment and of the share of local sourcing
5.3.1.2.2.2.1. General considerations
5.3.1.2.2.2.2. Credible level of local sourcing of machinery and equipment in the counterfactual scenario
5.3.1.2.2.2.3. Credible level of local sourcing of machinery and equipment for Investment 2 in Göd
5.3.1.2.2.3. Summary
5.3.1.2.3. Public support for the alternative location in China
5.3.1.2.3.1. Potential investment grant in China
5.3.1.2.3.2. Corporate income tax (CIT) in China of 15 % instead of 25 %
5.3.1.2.4. Discrete and probabilistic approaches to plausible NPV gap calculations
5.3.1.2.5. Conclusion on the incentive effect
5.3.2.
Need for State intervention
5.3.3.
Appropriateness
5.3.4.
Proportionality of the aid amount
5.3.5.
Avoidance of manifest undue negative effects on competition and trade
5.3.5.1.
No manifest negative effect on trade: The adjusted aid intensity ceiling is not exceeded
5.3.5.2.
No manifest negative effect on competition: The aid does not create overcapacity in a market in absolute decline
5.3.5.3.
No manifest negative effect on trade: No counter-cohesion effect
5.3.5.4.
No manifest negative effect on trade: Closure of activities elsewhere – potential relocation from Austria
5.3.5.5.
Conclusion on the avoidance of manifest negative effects on competition and trade
5.3.6.
No other undue negative effects
5.3.7.
Balancing of positive and negative effects of the aid
5.3.8.
Transparency
5.3.9.
No relevant breach of EU law
5.3.10.
Conclusion on compatibility of aid measure
6.
CONCLUSION
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3