INHALT

Commission Decision (EU) 2016/449 of 28 July 2015 on State aid SA.38544 2014/C (ex 2014/N) which France is planning to implement in favour of Kem One (notified under document C(2015) 5169) (Text with EEA relevance)

COMMISSION DECISION (EU) 2016/449
of 28 July 2015
on State aid SA.38544 2014/C (ex 2014/N) which France is planning to implement in favour of Kem One
(notified under document C(2015) 5169)
(Only the French version is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
1.
PROCEDURE
2.
BACKGROUND
2.1. THE BENEFICIARY: KEM ONE
Diagram 1
Structure of the Kem One group before the takeover
Diagram 2
Kem One activities in the PVC production chain
2.2. THE DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED BY KEM ONE
2.2.1.
Kem One's structural handicaps
2.2.1.1.
The vertical disintegration of the ethylene chain
2.2.1.2.
The heart of the production process (electrolysis) is dated and underperforming
2.2.1.3.
High production costs
2.2.1.4.
A commercial policy too geared to southern Europe
2.2.2.
Kem One's financial difficulties
2.2.3.
Insolvency and the opening of the court-supervised administration procedure
2.3. DESCRIPTION OF THE PUBLIC SUPPORT MEASURES
2.3.1.
The FDES loan (EUR 30 million)
2.3.2.
The grant (EUR 15 million) and repayable advances (EUR 80 million)
2.3.3.
Possible write-off of tax and social security debts
2.4. KEM ONE'S RESTRUCTURING PLAN
2.4.1.
The planned measures
2.4.1.1.
Industrial measures: Modernisation of the production process, in particular the electrolysis cells at Lavéra
2.4.1.2.
Commercial measures: reorientation of commercial policy towards value-added markets
2.4.1.3.
Financial measures: reduction in structural costs
2.4.2.
Estimate of restructuring costs and financing of the restructuring plan
2.4.3.
Kem One's business plan
3.
DOUBTS RAISED IN THE OPENING DECISION
3.1. CLASSIFICATION AS STATE AID
3.1.1.
FDES loan
3.1.1.1.
Value of collateral
3.1.1.2.
Level of remuneration of the loan
3.1.2.
Grant and repayable advances
3.1.3.
Possible write-off of social security and tax debts
3.2. COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT
3.2.1.
Restoration of Kem One's long-term viability
3.2.2.
Prevention of distortion of competition
3.2.3.
Aid limited to the minimum
4.
RESPONSE BY FRANCE TO THE OPENING DECISION
4.1. ON THE CLASSIFICATION AS STATE AID
4.1.1.
FDES loan
4.1.1.1.
Value of collateral
4.1.1.2.
Level of remuneration
4.1.1.3.
Amount of aid
4.1.2.
Grant and repayable advances
4.1.3.
Possible write-off of tax and social security debts
4.2. COMPATIBILITY
4.2.1.
Restoration of viability
4.2.2.
The company's own contribution
5.
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES AND OBSERVATIONS BY FRANCE
5.1. COMMENTS BY INTERESTED THIRD PARTIES
5.1.1.
Comments by Ineos
5.1.1.1.
Amount of State aid and own contribution by Kem One
5.1.1.2.
Restructuring plan
5.1.1.3.
Compensatory measures
5.1.2.
Comments by anonymous undertaking 1
5.1.2.1.
Justification for State aid
5.1.2.2.
Amount of State aid
5.1.2.3.
Compensatory measures
5.1.3.
Comments by Arkema
5.1.4.
Comments by Vestolit
5.1.5.
Comments by the ECVM
5.1.6.
Comments by anonymous undertaking 2
5.2. OBSERVATIONS BY FRANCE
5.2.1.1.
Classification of the measures as aid
5.2.1.2.
Compatibility of the measures with the internal market
6.
ASSESSMENT OF THE AID MEASURES
6.1. ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESENCE OF AID WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 107(1) TFEU
6.1.1.
Involvement of State resources and imputability to the State
6.1.2.
Selectivity
6.1.3.
Presence of an economic advantage
6.1.3.1.
The FDES loan (EUR 30 million)
6.1.3.2.
The grant (EUR 15 million) and repayable advances (EUR 80 million)
6.1.3.3.
Possible write-off of tax and social security debts
6.1.4.
Effect on competition and trade between Member States
6.1.5.
Conclusion with regard to the presence of aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU
6.2. ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPATIBILITY OF THE MEASURES WITH THE APPLICABLE STATE AID RULES
6.2.1.
Applicable legal basis
6.2.2.
Kem One's eligibility for restructuring aid
6.2.3.
Restoration of long-term viability
6.2.3.1.
On the restructuring costs
6.2.3.2.
On the duration of the restructuring plan
6.2.3.3.
On whether the scenarios for the return to viability are realistic
6.2.4.
Avoidance of undue distortions of competition
6.2.4.1.
Divestment of assets is not an appropriate compensatory measure in this instance
6.2.4.2.
No long-term structural overcapacity in the relevant market
6.2.4.3.
Compensatory measures deemed appropriate by the Commission
6.2.4.4.
Monitoring and six-monthly reports
6.2.5.
Aid limited to the minimum: real contribution, free of aid
6.2.6.
‘One time, last time’ principle
7.
CONCLUSION
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5