2024/656

20.2.2024

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2024/656

of 19 February 2024

on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the area of nuclear security

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

(1) On 12 December 2003 the European Council adopted the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’).

(2) The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through financial support to specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (‘IAEA’).

(3) In the framework of the implementation of the Strategy, the Council adopted four Joint Actions and four Decisions on support for activities of the IAEA, namely Joint Actions 2004/495/CFSP (1), 2005/574/CFSP (2), 2006/418/CFSP (3), 2008/314/CFSP (4) and Decisions 2010/585/CFSP (5), 2013/517/CFSP (6), (CFSP) 2016/2383 (7) extended by (CFSP) 2020/755 (8) and (CFSP) 2020/1656 (9) extended by (CFSP) 2022/1852 (10). That Union support should be continued.

(4) The 2022 Strategic Compass for Security and Defence refers to the persistent threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, the expanding nuclear arsenals, the development of new weapon systems as well as the use of nuclear threats by some countries, and expresses the Union’s objective of reinforcing concrete actions in support of the goals of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control.

(5) The technical implementation of this Decision should be entrusted to the IAEA. The action as supported by the Union is financed through an extra-budgetary contribution to the IAEA,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   With a view to the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy and the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, the Union shall further support the activities of the IAEA through an operational action.

2.   The overall objectives of the action referred to in paragraph 1 shall be to:

(a) promote adherence to relevant legally and non-legally binding international instruments to enhance nuclear security globally;

(b) assist States in establishing, maintaining and sustaining national nuclear security regimes for nuclear and other radioactive materials, including during transport, and associated facilities used for peaceful purposes;

(c) support the IAEA in playing the central role of facilitating and enhancing international cooperation and increasing visibility and awareness through communication on nuclear security.

3.   The specific objectives of the action referred to in paragraph 1 shall be to:

(a) provide nuclear security assistance to Ukraine;

(b) strengthen the participation of women in careers related to nuclear security, in particular the Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme;

(c) build capacity to strengthen nuclear security in IAEA Member States.

4.   A detailed description of the action referred to in paragraph 1 is set out in the Annex.

Article 2

1.   The High Representative (‘HR’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.

2.   The technical implementation of the action referred to in Article 1 shall be carried out by the IAEA.

3.   The IAEA shall perform the task referred to in paragraph 2 under the responsibility of the HR. For that purpose, the HR shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the IAEA.

Article 3

1.   The financial reference amount for the implementation of the action referred to in Article 1 shall be EUR 7 200 000.

2.   The expenditure financed by the reference amount set out in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the rules and procedures applicable to the general budget of the Union.

3.   The Commission shall supervise the proper management of the expenditure financed by the reference amount referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a contribution agreement with the IAEA. The contribution agreement shall stipulate that the IAEA is to ensure the visibility of the Union’s contribution, appropriate to its size.

4.   The Commission shall endeavour to conclude the agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of the conclusion of the agreement.

Article 4

1.   The HR shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision on the basis of regular reports by the IAEA. The reports shall form the basis of the evaluation carried out by the Council.

2.   The Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the action referred to in Article 1.

Article 5

1.   This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

2.   This Decision shall expire 36 months after the conclusion of the agreement referred to in Article 3(3). However, it shall expire six months after the date of its entry into force if no agreement has been concluded within that period.

Done at Brussels, 19 February 2024.

For the Council

The President

J. BORRELL FONTELLES

(1)  Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 182, 19.5.2004, p. 46

).

(2)  Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 44

).

(3)  Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP of 12 June 2006 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 165, 17.6.2006, p. 20

).

(4)  Council Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP of 14 April 2008 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 107, 17.4.2008, p. 62

).

(5)  Council Decision 2010/585/CFSP of 27 September 2010 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 259,1.10.2010, p. 10

).

(6)  Council Decision 2013/517/CFSP of 21 October 2013 on the Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 281, 23.10.2013, p. 6

).

(7)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 of 21 December 2016 on the Union support for the International Atomic Energy Agency activities in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 352, 23.12.2016, p. 74

).

(8)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/755 of 8 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 on the Union support for the International Atomic Energy Agency activities in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 179 I, 9.6.2020, p. 2

).

(9)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 372 I, 9.11.2020, p. 4

).

(10)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2022/1852 of 4 October 2022 amending Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (

OJ L 257, 5.10.2022, p. 10

).

ANNEX

PROJECT DOCUMENT

EU SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) IN THE AREA OF NUCLEAR SECURITY IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU STRATEGY AGAINST PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

CYCLE IX (2024-2027)

1.   INTRODUCTION

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission (further referred to as ‘the Contracting Authority’) have been cooperating under the Financial and Administrative Framework Agreement (FAFA) between the European Community and the United Nations signed on 29 April 2003, to which the Organization adhered on 17 September 2004, as adapted on 31 December 2018 between the European Commission and the Organization.

The EU regularly stresses the need to continue strengthening nuclear security worldwide in order to prevent nuclear terrorism and facilitate the development of peaceful uses of nuclear technology and acknowledges the IAEA’s central role in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally, in coordinating international cooperation in nuclear security activities and providing technical assistance to Member States.

Since 2004, the EU provided financial support to IAEA activities in the field of nuclear security, through eight successive cycles of contributions. The Agency carries out projects addressing its Member States’ development needs in areas within the scope of the Contracting Authority’s Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI).

The proposed elements of the Action are based on the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan 2022-2025, approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 14 September 2021 and noted by the General Conference on 15 September 2021 (GC(65)/24).

Through General Conference resolutions, Member States have asserted that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State and that they are mindful of the responsibilities of every Member State, in accordance with its respective national and international obligations, to maintain at all times effective and comprehensive nuclear security of all nuclear and other radioactive material.

The proposed Action is also defined in consistency with Programme 3.5 of the Agency’s Programme and Budget.

The activities under this Action Document will be coordinated with and complemented by other voluntary contributions to the Organization’s Nuclear Security Fund and the IAEA’s Regular Budget funds, and will be implemented as a multi-donor Action.

2.   OVERALL OBJECTIVE

In the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the overall objective of this EU Action is to support activities conducted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the area of nuclear security as follow:

— To promote adherence to relevant legally and non-legally binding international instruments to enhance nuclear security globally.

— To assist States in establishing, maintaining and sustaining national nuclear security regimes for nuclear and other radioactive materials, including during transport, and associated facilities used for peaceful purposes.

— To support the IAEA in playing the central role of facilitating and enhancing international cooperation and increasing visibility and awareness through communication on nuclear security.

3.   SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES

To achieve this overall objective, the Action is structured around the following specific objectives:

4.   DESCRIPTION OF OUTPUTS AND ACTIVITIVES FOR EACH SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 1

– PROVIDE NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO UKRAINE

Background

Since February 2022, the Agency provided support to help ensure safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities and activities involving radioactive sources in Ukraine. This includes undertaking impartial assessments of the situation pertaining to nuclear safety, security and safeguards; providing technical expertise and advice; delivering nuclear safety- and security-related equipment; and sharing relevant information with the international community. The events affecting the off-site power to all NPPs represented a concerning development. It highlighted the need for the Agency to further intensify and deepen its technical work in Ukraine, with the aim of helping to stabilize the situation and prevent a nuclear incident or accident. This was achieved through, inter alia, establishing a continued presence of Agency staff at all nuclear sites in Ukraine as well as a the establishment of the five concrete principles for protecting the Zaporizhzhya NPP (ZNPP).

In resolution GOV/2022/17, the IAEA Board of Governors requested the Director-General and the Secretariat to “continue to closely monitor the situation [in Ukraine], with a special focus on the safety and security of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities and report to the Board on these elements, as required”; in resolution GOV/2022/58, the Board of Governors requested the Director-General to “continue to closely monitor the situation and report formally to the Board on these matters as long as required”; and in resolution GOV/2022/71, the Board of Governors requested the Director-General to “continue to closely monitor the situation [in Ukraine] and regularly report formally to the Board on these matters as long as required.”

In resolution GC(67)/RES/16, the General Conference expressed its full support to “the continued and reinforced physical presence of the IAEA Support and Assistance Mission to Zaporizhzhya (ISAMZ), given the ongoing risks to nuclear safety, security, and safeguards implementation at the ZNPP” and to “the Agency’s continued provision, upon request, of technical support and assistance to Ukraine to help ensure the safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities and activities involving radioactive sources, including the continued physical presence of IAEA technical experts at the Chornobyl, Rivne, Khmelnytskyy, and South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plants."

The deployment of IAEA nuclear safety and security experts to all five Ukrainian nuclear power plant sites took place in January 2023. Their presence allows the Agency to provide the international community with reliable information on the safety and security situation at each site, while our experts assist the plants’ technical staff with the numerous challenges they face in operation of nuclear facilities during wartime.

As of 1 November 2022, the EU provided financial support to nculear security assistance to Ukraine under the cycle VIII of the EU Action in the area of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Heading 7). Specific Objective 1 is a continuation of this activity.

Output 1: Expert missions of Agency staff in Ukraine are deployed and the situation pertaining to nuclear security is continuously assessed.

Expected Activities for Output 1:

— Security trainings to prepare staff travels to Ukraine,

— IAEA missions to Ukraine.

Output 2: Nuclear security of nuclear material and facilities, radioactive material in use, storage and of associated facilities and physical protection are enhanced throught the provision of equipment including the repairs, strengthening and upgrading of existing physical protection systems.

Expected Activities for Output 2:

— Assess and further define equipment needs expressed by Ukraine counterparts to enable adequate procurement,

— Procurement of equipment,

— Possible trainings.

Output 3: When possible depending on the situation in the field, IAEA assistance to the competent authority of Ukraine is provided to regain regulatory control over radioactive sources out of regulatory control.

Expected Activities for Output 3:

— Missions,

— Possible consultancy contracts.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 2

– STRENGTHEN PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN NUCLEAR SECURITY CAREERS THROUGH GENDER-FOCUSED EDUCATION (MARIE SKLODOWSKA CURIE FELLOWSHIP PROGRAMME)

Background

The Marie Sklodowska-Curie Fellowship Programme (MSCFP) aims to help increase the number of women in the nuclear field, supporting an inclusive workforce of both men and women who contribute to and drive global scientific and technological innovation.

The Programme aims to inspire and encourage young women to pursue a career in the nuclear field, by providing highly motivated female students with scholarships for Master’s programmes in nuclear related studies at accredited universities and an opportunity to pursue an internship facilitated by the IAEA for up to 12 months.

Specific Objective 2 is proposed in continuation of Heading 6 in the previous EU Action.

The goal is to encourage young women to pursue a career in nuclear sciences and technology and non-proliferation studies by providing highly motivated and talented female students scholarships for graduate degree programmes along with IAEA internship opportunities. In the long term, the Programme will contribute to a new generation of female science, technology, engineering and mathematics leaders, who will drive scientific and technological developments in their countries.

Output 1: The programme will fund students for the scholarships for a period of up to two-years.

Expected Activities for Output 1:

— Selection of students

— Provision of scholarships

Output 2: Student will be offered the opportunity to pursue an internship facilited by the IAEA for up to 12 months.

Expected Activities for Output 2:

— Identification of intership opportunities

— Provision of internships.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE 3

– BUILDING CAPACITY TO STRENGTHEN NUCLEAR SECURITY

High volume of requests for support in education and training across all technical areas of nuclear security continues to be received by the Agency. To address these requests and to help States establish and sustain national nuclear security regimes more broadly, the IAEA implements capacity building assistance, including through the Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC). This assistance is based on a baseline assessment of States nuclear security needs and priorities.

COMPONENT A

– DEVELOPING CAPACITY BUILDING BASELINE: SUPPORT TO STATES IN ASSESSING NUCLEAR SECURITY NEEDS AND PRIORITIES (INSSP)

Background

The IAEA assists States in establishing, maintaining and sustaining national nuclear security regimes for nuclear and other radioactive materials, including during transport, and associated facilities used for peaceful purposes.

To enable this assistance, the IAEA developed the Integrated Nuclear Security Sustainability Plan (INSSP) which provides States, upon request, with a systematic and comprehensive framework for reviewing their nuclear security regimes and identifying areas where they need to be strengthened. The Plans also highlight any assistance needed to support the development of an effective and sustainable nuclear security regime.

Together with the IAEA, the State consolidates its prioritized nuclear security needs into an INSSP. Each INSSP is tailored to the State’s specific needs, using guidance provided in Nuclear Security Series publications as its basis.

The Specific Objective 3 is to strengthen support to States in assessing nuclear security needs and priorities. This will be done through providing a comprehensive framework in order to systematically identify and prioritize States’ nuclear security needs and to support planning and prioritizing the provision of Agency nuclear security assistance to States, as well as to facilitate international cooperation and coordination in meeting Member States’ nuclear security needs.

Output 1: Development and implementation of State level Integrated Nuclear Security Sustainability Plan (INSSPs) to identify and prioritize nuclear security needs.

Expected Activities for Output 1:

— Implementation of INSSP review missions and implementation INSSP finalization missions.

Output 2: Further enhancing common understanding of the importance of nuclear security and of the essential components of the nuclear security regime

.

Expected Activities for Output 2:

— Regional Coordination Workshops

COMPONENT B

– CAPACITY BUILDING IN COMPUTER SECURITY

Background

Member States continue to recognize the threat of cyberattacks and their potential impact on nuclear security, as well as the need to take effective security measures against such attacks. Member State demand for assistance in the area of information and computer security, including requests for support for developing computer security regulations, has increased and is expected to continue rising.

The Agency continues assisting Member States in raising awareness of the threat of cyberattacks and their potential impact on nuclear security, by supporting States in taking effective security measures against such attacks and improving their relevant nuclear security capabilities.

Enhanced computer security and information security capabilities in States through raising awareness of the threat of cyberattacks, and their potential impact on nuclear security, support States in taking effective security measures against such attacks.

This contributes to gaining enhanced information and computer security capabilities at the State and facility levels to support the prevention and detection of, and response to, computer security incidents that have the potential to either directly or indirectly adversely impact nuclear safety and security.

Output 1: Nuclear security professionals are trained on information and computer security, including basic concepts of computer security such as threats, risk and security controls.

Expected Activities for Output 1:

— International, regional and national training courses.

COMPONENT C

– STRENGTHEN STATES’ NUCLEAR SECURITY DETECTION ARCHITECTURE THROUGH CAPACITY BUILDING

Background

The international community has recognized the serious threat posed by nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control; therefore, continuous efforts are required to strengthen national capabilities for establishing and maintaining effective national Nuclear Security Detection architectures. The Agency develops comprehensive nuclear security guidance to contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security objectives and developed a project approach with Member States, to promote the use of IAEA nuclear security guidance through peer reviews, advisory services, capacity building activities and assistance with the deployment of detection equipment. The project approach identifies a clear structure for assistance and support to States in developing an integrated set of nuclear security systems and measures, based on an appropriate legal and regulatory framework, that constitute a national strategy and associated capabilities for the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

The Agency also faced an increased demand for train-the-trainers courses for instructors of front line officers on the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

The Component C will support strengthening and maintaining effective national nuclear security detection architectures in States, through capacity building to enhance and improve capabilities in detecting, locating and interdicting nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

Output 1: States capabilities to detect criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material are enhanced through trainings, expert missions, peer review and field or Table top exercises

Expected Activities for Output 1:

— International, and regional trainings to build capacity in the various areas of detection architecture,

— Field or table top exercises.

COMPONENT D

– STRENGTHEN STATES’ TRANSPORT SECURITY THROUGH CAPACITY BUILDING

Background

Nuclear and other radioactive material is potentially vulnerable to security threats during transport. The IAEA assists states to implement and to maintain a national nuclear security regime for the transport of such material.

One of the key element of this assistance is provided through capacity building. Training are implemented at internationl and regional level, to provide national counterparts involved in transport security with the understanding of the need for security measures during transport of radioactive material and the knowledge to develop and implement national transport security requirements. In these trainings, the IAEA delivers a comprehensive insight into radioactive material categorization, security functions, security management, and the safety and security interface. They also provide participants with opportunities to engage in scenario-based discussions and exercises.

Agency missions are conducted to review draft national regulation on transport of nuclear and other radioactive material in support of the finalization of the country’s national transport regulation.

Output 1: Member States relevant counterparts are trained on security of transport of nuclear and other radioactive material.

Expected Activities for Output 1:

— International and regional training courses.

Output 2: Draft national tranports regulations on transport of nuclear and other radioactive material is reviewed.

Expected Activities for Output 2:

— Agency missions

COMPONENT E

– NUCLEAR FORENSICS

Background

The examination of nuclear and other radioactive materials using analytical techniques to determine the origin and history of this material is used in the context of law enforcement investigations or the assessment of nuclear security vulnerabilities.

The results of the examination support the response to the unauthorized use of these materials and help States make informed decisions to improve their nuclear security practices. The IAEA assists States to enhance their capabilities in the field of nuclear forensics in particualr by providing trainings and workshops at international and regional level.

Trainings are key enablers to increase knowledge of nuclear forensics to prevent and respond to a nuclear security event, familiarize responders with collecting evidence supporting a nuclear forensics examination to include establishing a chain of custody, as well as orienting practitioners to current nuclear forensic methodologies.

Output 1: Member States relevant counterparts are trained on nuclear forensics to prevent and respond to a nuclear security event.

Expected Activities for Output 1:

— International and regional training courses

— International Integrated Workshop on Radiological Crime Scene Management and Nuclear Forensics

COMPONENT F

– SUPPORT TO MEMBER STATES NUCLEAR SECURITY EDUCATION AND TRAINING CAPACITY

Background

Education and training activities based on a systematic approach support States in providing managers and personnel with the knowledge, skills and attitudes necessary to discharge their duties and perform their jobs and tasks in various areas of nuclear security.

In 2023, the Agency established its Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre (NSTDC) at its Seibersdorf laboratories which will complement training opportunities offered in Member States and Nuclear Security Support Centres, and will enhance nuclear security capacity building through the use of advanced technology and expertise.

The Agency’s support to national capacity building capabilities in the area of nuclear security continue to be implemented in close collaboration with States, including through the activities of the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN), National Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSCs), the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network), and Collaborating Centres.

NSSCs contribute to sustaining the national nuclear security regime by supporting competent authorities, authorized persons, and other organizations with nuclear security responsibilities. Main NSSC functions are:

— Human resource development, specifically through the provision of a national nuclear security training programme;

— Technical support services for nuclear security equipment lifecycle management; and

— Scientific support services for provision of expertise, analysis, and research and development for nuclear security.

IAEA online learning modules in nuclear security, based on the IAEA Nuclear Security Series and other guidance documents, are used to complements face-to-face trainings and supports efforts to ensure competence, skills and strong nuclear security culture. The e-learning modules target a wide range of professionals with nuclear security responsibilities and others interested.

Component F will contribute to the devlopment and maintenance of the e-learning nuclear security modules and to supporting States in their effort to develop efficient and sustainable trainings in nuclear security and States wanting to establish and operate an NSSC.

Output 1: Development and maintenance of e-learning material for nuclear security trainings

Expected Activities for Output 1:

— Production of e-learning courses incl. translations,

— Review and maintenance of e-learning courses.

Output 2: Capabilities to develop and implement nuclear security training and manage human resources are enhanced. Experience and good practice in nuclear security training are shared.

Expected Activities for Output 2:

— International and regional workshops, including translations.

ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2024/656/oj

ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)