COMMISSION DECISION
of 25 January 2012
Measures C 36/07 (ex NN 25/07) implemented by Germany for Deutsche Post AG
(notified under document C(2012) 184)
(Only the German version is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2012/636/EU)
I.
PROCEDURE
I.1.
State aid Procedures
I.1.1.
1999 Opening Decision and 2002 Decision
I.1.2.
Further complaints after 2002 Decision
I.1.3.
2007 Extension decision
I.1.4.
Comments by Germany on 2007 Extension decision
I.1.5.
Comments by third parties to the 2007 Extension decision and comments by Germany on third party comments
I.1.6.
Procurement of external expert
I.1.7.
Comments by Germany on appropriate length of investigation period
I.1.8.
Information request of 17 July 2008
I.1.9.
Reminder for information of 12 August 2008 and 22 August 2008
I.1.10.
Information injunction of 30 October 2008
I.1.11.
Submission of accounting information for the period 1990-2007
I.1.12.
Submission of WIK Study
I.1.13.
Comments following annulment of 2002 Decision
I.1.14.
2011 Extension decision
I.2.
Antitrust Procedures
I.3.
Court Procedures
I.3.1.
Case T-421/07 Deutsche Post AG v Commission
I.3.2.
Case T-570/08 Deutsche Post AG v Commission and Case T-571/08 Germany v Commission
I.3.3.
Case C-463/10 P Deutsche Post AG v Commission and Case C-475/10 P Germany v Commission
I.3.4.
Case T-344/10 UPS v Commission
I.3.5.
Case T-388/11 Deutsche Post AG v Commission
II.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PUBLIC MEASURES
II.1.
Pension subsidy in the context of social benefits and contribution schemes for civil servants and private employees
II.1.1.
Social benefits for civil servants
II.1.2.
Financing of civil servants' social benefits in the period 1989-1994 at POSTDIENST
II.1.3.
Financing of social benefits for DPAG's civil servants since 1995
Figure 1
Financing of Pension fund (million EUR)
II.1.4.
Statutory social insurances for private employees and supplementary pension insurance for Deutsche Post's private employees
Figure 2
Compulsory social contribution rates in percentage of private employee's gross wage (see also the Annex)
II.2.
Public transfers and guarantee in the context of Deutsche Post's exclusive right and universal postal service obligations
II.2.1.
Exclusive right until 2007
II.2.2.
Universal postal service obligation until 2007
II.2.3.
Public transfers
II.2.4.
Public guarantee for debt obligations issued before 1995
II.3.
Revenues from regulated prices as additional compensation for pension costs and universal services' net costs
II.3.1.
2002 Price cap decision
# |
Burdens from 2002 Price cap decision |
Average burden (1998-2006) million EUR |
% |
1 |
Excess wage costs |
[…] |
[…] |
2 |
Excess social costs |
[…] |
[…] |
3 |
Infrastructural burden post shops |
[…] |
[…] |
4 |
Supplementary pension insurance for employees (VAP) |
[…] |
[…] |
5 |
Infrastructural burden freight |
[…] |
[…] |
6 |
Social and health cost (BAnstPT) |
[…] |
[…] |
7 |
Personnel restructuring |
[…] |
[…] |
8 |
Deficit coverage for civil servants' health insurance |
[…] |
[…] |
|
Total average burden |
[…] |
100 % |
II.3.1.1. Excess wages (burden #1)
II.3.1.2. Excess social contributions (burden #2)
|
|
|
|
|
% of incurred wages |
(1) |
|
Contribution rate for pension fund |
33 % |
|
|
(2) |
|
Civil servants' wage sum |
[…] |
|
|
(3) |
=(1)*(2) |
Contribution to pension fund |
[…] |
|
|
(4) |
|
Health care expenses |
[…] |
|
|
(5) |
=(3)+(4) |
Incurred social contributions |
|
[…] |
[40 to 45 %] |
(6) |
|
Employer's share of social contributions |
20,43 % |
|
|
(7) |
|
Accident insurance |
[…] |
|
|
(8) |
|
Supplementary pension insurance |
[…] |
|
|
(9) |
=(6)+(7)+(8) |
Regulatory contribution rate |
[…] |
|
|
(10) |
=(2)*(9) |
Regulatory benchmark social cost |
|
[…] |
[20 to 25 %] |
(11) |
=(5)–(10) |
Excess social contributions |
|
[…] |
[15 to 20 %] |
II.3.1.3. Supplementary pension insurance for private employees (burden #4)
II.3.1.4. Miscellaneous excess social costs (burdens #6, 7, 8)
II.3.1.5. Universal service burdens (#3 and 5)
II.3.2.
2007 and 2011 Price cap decisions
II.4.
Financial results of DPAG
III.
GROUNDS FOR INITIATION OF PROCEDURE
III.1.
Pension subsidy
III.2.
Universal service compensation
IV.
WIK STUDY
IV.1.
Description of the 2009 regulatory accounts
IV.1.1.
The revenues
Figure 3
Average revenue shares in the period 1990-2007 (based on nominal values)
IV.1.2.
The calculation of burdens in the 2009 regulatory accounts
Figure 4
Claimed universal service burdens with 2009 regulatory accounts compared to approved burdens with 2002 Price cap decision (annual average, million EUR nominal value)
IV.1.3.
The profit margins in the 2009 regulatory accounts
Figure 5
Average returns on sales based on 2009 regulatory accounts
IV.2.
Profit benchmarking
IV.2.1.
Deutsche Post's value chain: low-tech operations and low level of business risk
IV.2.1.1. The value chain of a low-tech business
IV.2.1.2. Low risk due to public measures
IV.2.2.
Quantification of profit benchmarks
|
Return on Sales (ROS) |
Return on Assets (ROA) |
Median |
3,48 % |
7,33 % |
Upper bound (75th percentile) |
6,77 % |
13,41 % |
IV.3.
Review of cost allocation
IV.4.
Adjustment of 2009 regulatory accounts
|
Revenues of universal services |
– |
Costs of universal services |
– |
Reasonable profit |
+ |
Public transfer |
|
Excess result |
IV.4.1.
Adjustment of universal service revenues
IV.4.2.
Adjustment of universal service costs
IV.4.2.1. Dissolution of accounts
IV.4.2.2. Adjustment of burdens between price-regulated and non-price regulated services
IV.4.2.3. Off-balance costs with supplementary pension insurance (burden #4)
IV.4.3.
Adjustment of capital costs to reasonable profit
IV.4.3.1. Period 1996 to 2007
IV.4.3.2. Period 1990 to 1995
IV.4.4.
Conclusions
Figure 6
Comparison of annual excess results of universal services for the period 1990-2007 (million EUR, nominal annual values)
V.
COMMENTS BY INTERESTED PARTIES
V.1.
Right to use official German stamps
V.2.
Pension subsidy
V.3.
Universal service compensation
V.4.
Excessive letter prices
V.5.
Profit margins
VI.
COMMENTS BY GERMANY
VI.1.
Comments on pension subsidy
VI.1.1.
No financial advantage from compensation of excess social costs
VI.1.2.
No financial advantage compared to pre-1995 situation
VI.1.3.
Pension subsidy as existing aid pursuant to Article 108(1)
VI.1.4.
Pension subsidy as compatible compensation for legacy costs pursuant to Article 107(3) TFEU
VI.1.4.1. Benchmark to be based on ‘competitive’ social costs
VI.1.4.2. Insufficient level of price-regulated revenues to cover excess social costs
(a)
Under-compensation of excess social costs based on expert study
– |
Contribution to Pension fund |
– |
other social costs |
+ |
‘Competitive’ social cost benchmark (based on employer's share of social contribution rate and ‘competitive’ wage (e.g. 2007 minimum wage)) |
|
Excess social costs |
+ |
Compensation from regulated revenues (burden #2 on excess social contributions) |
|
Net result (under- or over-compensation) |
(b)
2009 regulatory accounts confirm insufficiency of price-regulated revenues to cover excess social costs
VI.2.
Comments on universal service compensation
VI.2.1.
Public transfers
VI.2.2.
Public guarantee
VI.2.3.
Exclusive right
VI.3.
Comments on WIK study
VI.3.1.
WIK study confirms the necessity of public transfers as compensation for net costs of universal service obligations up to 1995
VI.3.2.
Defective profit benchmarking
VI.3.3.
Inappropriate cost allocation and valuation
VI.4.
Comments on interested parties' comments
VI.4.1.
Pension subsidy
VI.4.2.
Universal service compensation
VI.4.3.
Wage level
VII.
AID ASSESSMENT OF PENSION SUBSIDY
VII.1.
Assessment of existence of aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU
VII.1.1.
Financial advantage from 1995 pension reform
VII.1.2.
Distortion of competition and affectation of trade
VII.2.
Assessment of existing aid pursuant to Article 108(1) TFEU
VII.3.
Assessment of compatibility pursuant to Article 107(3)(c) TFEU
VII.3.1.
Market opening of the postal sector as an objective of common interest
VII.3.2.
Necessity and proportionality of the pension subsidy
VII.3.2.1. Level of wage-based social security contributions of other undertakings in the mail/parcel sector
(a)
Calculation of the benchmark rate
Figure 7
Determination of benchmark rate for DP's social contribution
(b)
Calculation of the wage base
Table 6
Calculation of civil servants' gross wage (based on 2006 contribution rates)
VII.3.2.2. Establishment of the wage-based social security contributions borne by Deutsche Post for its civil servants
(a)
Deutsche Post's contribution in the period 1995-2002
(b)
Deutsche Post's contribution since 2003
VII.3.2.3. Comparison
(a)
The period 1995-2002
(b)
The period since 2003
|
Social contribution rate |
Regulatory contribution rate |
Benchmark rate for DP's social contribution charge |
in percentage of |
Private employee's gross wage |
Civil servant's gross wage |
Civil servant's gross wage |
Employer's share |
20,50 % |
17,84 % |
20,50 % |
Health insurance |
6,65 % |
5,79 % |
6,65 % |
Nursing insurance |
0,85 % |
0,74 % |
0,85 % |
Unemployment insurance |
3,25 % |
2,83 % |
3,25 % |
Pension insurance |
9,75 % |
8,48 % |
9,75 % |
Employee's share |
20,50 % |
|
|
Health insurance |
6,65 % |
|
|
Nursing insurance |
0,85 % |
|
|
Unemployment insurance |
3,25 % |
|
3,25 % |
Pension insurance |
9,75 % |
|
9,75 % |
Supplementary pension insurance |
|
[0 to 5 %] |
|
Accident insurance |
|
[0 to 5 %] |
|
Contribution rate |
|
[17,5 to 22,5 %] |
33,50 % |
VII.3.2.4. Preliminary conclusion on necessity and proportionality
VII.3.2.5. Impact of the particular competitive and regulatory environment on necessity and proportionality
VII.3.3.
Conclusion
Figure 8
Comparative advantage in social contribution rate with non-price regulated services (contribution rates in percentage of civil servants' gross wage)
|
Incompatible aid = |
|
|
= |
(Benchmark rate — regulatory contribution rate) |
× |
Civil servants' gross wage sum in non-price regulated services |
VII.3.4.
Response to the arguments presented by Germany
VII.3.4.1. The Commission is right to include the employees' contribution into the benchmark rate and not to adjust the wage level to a ‘competitive wage’
VII.3.4.2. On Germany's claim that price-regulated revenues have not been sufficient to finance the claimed burdens
(a)
The 2002, 2007 and 2011 price cap decisions are based on the regulatory accounts submitted by Deutsche Post and approve all burdens that have been claimed
(b)
The study by Professor Weber does not support the claim that the profits from the regulated universal services were insufficient to cover the burdens that Deutsche Post had claimed
|
Price cap for regulated services = |
= |
Efficient costs for regulated services + burdens = |
= |
Total costs for regulated services + burden for non-regulated services |
(c)
No proof of under-compensation of excess social costs based on WIK study
Figure 9
Calculation of ROS for price-regulated services based on WIK Study
(i) More appropriate allocation of costs to commercial services
(ii) Profit benchmarking in consideration of Deutsche Post's risk position
(c)
Conclusions
VII.3.5.
Elimination of incompatible aid for the period from 1 January 2003
VIII.
AID ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC TRANSFERS
VIII.1.
Assessment of existence of aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU
VIII.1.1.
Financial advantage granted by public transfers
VIII.1.1.1. Germany's claim of Ablieferungen as special charge
VIII.1.1.2. Germany's claim of public transfers in accordance with private-investor behaviour
VIII.1.1.3. Germany's claim of compensation of net costs from universal service obligation
VIII.1.2.
Conclusions on existence of aid
VIII.2.
Assessment of existing aid pursuant to Article 108(3) TFEU
VIII.3.
Assessment of compatibility pursuant to Article 106(2) TFEU
VIII.3.1.
Entrustment with a service of general economic interest
VIII.3.2.
Necessity and proportionality of public transfers
|
2009 regulatory accounts |
WIK study |
Cumulated net costs |
– EUR […] million |
– EUR […] million |
Public transfers |
+ EUR 6 707 million |
+ EUR 6 707 million |
Over-/under-compensation |
– EUR […] million |
+ EUR [0 to 20] million |
IX.
THE PUBLIC GUARANTEE FOR DEBT OBLIGATIONS ISSUED BEFORE 1995 CONSTITUTES EXISTING AID PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 108(3) TFEU
X.
CONCLUSIONS
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6
Article 7
ANNEX
Methodology for Calculation of incompatible aid (million EUR); Provisional calculation based on the data available as at 31 December 2011 for the period 2003- 2010
(1)
|
2003 |
2004 |
2005 |
2006 |
2007 |
2008 |
2009 |
2010 |
||
Social insurance contribution rates |
||||||||||
(1) |
Total social contribution rate |
|
42,20 % |
42,00 % |
41,54 % |
41,00 % |
39,70 % |
38,93 % |
39,25 % |
39,55 % |
(2) |
Health insurance |
|
14,50 % |
14,30 % |
13,84 % |
13,30 % |
13,90 % |
13,90 % |
14,60 % |
14,90 % |
(3) |
Nursing insurance |
|
1,70 % |
1,70 % |
1,70 % |
1,70 % |
1,70 % |
1,83 % |
1,95 % |
1,95 % |
(4) |
Unemployment insurance |
|
6,50 % |
6,50 % |
6,50 % |
6,50 % |
4,20 % |
3,30 % |
2,80 % |
2,80 % |
(5) |
Pension insurance |
|
19,50 % |
19,50 % |
19,50 % |
19,50 % |
19,90 % |
19,90 % |
19,90 % |
19,90 % |
(6) |
Employer’s share |
|
21,10 % |
21,00 % |
20,77 % |
20,50 % |
19,85 % |
19,46 % |
19,48 % |
19,33 % |
(7) |
Health insurance |
|
7,25 % |
7,15 % |
6,92 % |
6,65 % |
6,95 % |
6,95 % |
7,15 % |
7,00 % |
(8) |
Nursing insurance |
|
0,85 % |
0,85 % |
0,85 % |
0,85 % |
0,85 % |
0,91 % |
0,98 % |
0,98 % |
(9) |
Unemployment insurance |
|
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
2,10 % |
1,65 % |
1,40 % |
1,40 % |
(10) |
Pension insurance |
|
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
(11) |
Employee’s share |
|
21,10 % |
21,00 % |
20,77 % |
20,50 % |
19,85 % |
19,47 % |
19,77 % |
20,22 % |
(12) |
Health insurance |
|
7,25 % |
7,15 % |
6,92 % |
6,65 % |
6,95 % |
6,95 % |
7,45 % |
7,90 % |
(13) |
Nursing insurance |
|
0,85 % |
0,85 % |
0,85 % |
0,85 % |
0,85 % |
0,92 % |
0,97 % |
0,97 % |
(14) |
Unemployment insurance |
|
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
2,10 % |
1,65 % |
1,40 % |
1,40 % |
(15) |
Pension insurance |
|
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
(16) |
Supplementary pension insurance |
|
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
(17) |
Accident insurance |
|
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
Civil servants’ gross wage |
||||||||||
(18) |
Gross wage |
|
100 % |
100 % |
100 % |
100 % |
100 % |
100 % |
100 % |
100 % |
(19) |
Unemployment insurance (employee) |
|
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
2,10 % |
1,65 % |
1,40 % |
1,40 % |
(20) |
Pension insurance (employee) |
|
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
(21) |
Incurred civil servant wage in % |
= (18) - (19) - (20) |
87,00 % |
87,00 % |
87,00 % |
87,00 % |
87,95 % |
88,40 % |
88,65 % |
88,65 % |
(22) |
Civil servants’ wage sum |
|
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
(23) |
Civil servants’ gross wage sum |
= (22)/(21) |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
Regulatory contribution rate (recalculated based on civil servants’ gross wage) |
||||||||||
(24) |
Employer’s share |
= (6)*(21) |
18,36 % |
18,27 % |
18,07 % |
17,84 % |
17,46 % |
17,20 % |
17,27 % |
17,14 % |
(25) |
Supplementary pension insurance |
= (16)*(21) |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
(26) |
Accident insurance |
= (17)*(21) |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
(27) |
Regulatory rate |
|
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
Social insurance benchmark |
||||||||||
(28) |
Employer’s share |
|
21,10 % |
21,00 % |
20,77 % |
20,50 % |
19,85 % |
19,46 % |
19,48 % |
19,33 % |
(29) |
Unemployment insurance (employee) |
|
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
3,25 % |
2,10 % |
1,65 % |
1,40 % |
1,40 % |
(30) |
Pension insurance (employee) |
|
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,75 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
9,95 % |
(31) |
Social insurance benchmark |
|
34,10 % |
34,00 % |
33,77 % |
33,50 % |
31,90 % |
31,06 % |
30,83 % |
30,68 % |
Revenue share for non-regulated services |
||||||||||
(32) |
Total revenue |
|
14 683,21 |
14 726,82 |
14 479,35 |
13 773,79 |
13 479,96 |
13 392,81 |
12 846,17 |
12 656,75 |
(33) |
Non-regulated revenue |
|
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
(34) |
Share of non-price regulated services |
= (33)/(32) |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
Incompatible aid |
||||||||||
(35) |
Difference in contributions rates |
= (31) - (27) |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
(36) |
Incompatible aid |
= (23)*(34)*(35) |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
[…] |
(37) |
Sum 2003 to 2010 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[…] |