(169) This assessment is further supported by the public declarations of government ministers rendered both before the initial loan and the EUR 300 million loan were granted (see Section 2.5), namely that the government’s main concern was preventing the sudden interruption of air transport services and the direct and indirect repercussions entailed by such an exit. They include the effect on Italy’s economy and the alleged aim of preventing further losses to the taxpayer. According to those statements, the purpose was to give the extraordinary commissioners breathing room to find a buyer. That goal is reflected in the relevant legislation granting the two State loans and in Italy’s own submissions (see recital 78 et seq.), according to which those loans were needed for Alitalia’s management needs, to avoid the interruption of services and the social hardship and inconvenience entailed.
(170) The contemporaneous statements from members of the Italian government at the material time (see Section 2.5) support the view that the grounds on which Italy granted the two State loans were not those of a market economy operator. Instead, the objective underlying the decision to grant the two State loans were that ‘
stopping airplanes on the ground is not imaginable because the connections would be compromised and the travellers would be hurt
’ (65), that ‘
We cannot
[let it]
fail from morning to night because we would no longer have connections from one part of the country to the other
’ (66) and the ‘
putting the planes on the ground from morning to night would cost Italian taxpayers much more
’ (67).
(171) As set out in Section 4.1, Italy explained in detail the disruption that would be occasioned by Alitalia exiting the market, citing, in that respect, the number of passengers who had booked and the number of tickets which had been issued.
(172) Having examined the above elements, the Commission considers that the main purpose of the two State loans was to ensure that Alitalia kept operating for reasons of public policy rather than the financial interests of the State as a market economy operator. As such, any prospect that the State would make profit in connection with the two State loans, even in the long term, if that could be demonstrated, was merely incidental to the decision to grant the two State loans.
(173) Furthermore, the Court has held that ensuring the continuity of transport services provided by an undertaking is a consideration which a private investor would not take into account (68).
(174) In addition, the maturity dates of the two State loans were regularly postponed and, at the same time, the State also postponed the obligation of payment of interest by Alitalia to those new maturity dates. As a result of the Growth Decree-Law, interest ceased to accrue on the two State loans from 31 May 2019. This moreover shows that the interest rate value of 6-month Euribor + 10 % which Italy argues demonstrated that it acted as an MEO (see recital 95) is merely artificial, as the State – as a lender – never received remuneration for either its liquidity cost or the credit risk related to Alitalia that a market economy lender would have sought to cover. This together with the absence of an
ex-ante
study submitted by Italy showing the State had a financial interest to grant those prolongations and payment of interest relief instead of going forward with the counter-factual scenario shows that the State acted in its public power remit as regards Alitalia. That behaviour, namely granting those postponements without specific
ex-ante
study, failing to claim payment of the interest, eventually putting an end to the accrual of that interest from 31 May 2019, is not in line with that of an MEO but demonstrates the interest of a public authority to maintain the continuity of transport service provided by Alitalia.
The rules to which the measure is subject
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